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Abstract
We present the quantum model of Bertrand duopoly and study the
entanglement behavior on the profit functions of the firms. Using the
concept of optimal response of each firm to the price of the opponent,
we found only one Nash equilibirum point for maximally entangled initial
state. The very presence of quantum entanglement in the initial state
gives payoffs higher to the firms than the classical payoffs at the Nash
equilibrium. As a result the dilemma like situation in the classical game
is resolved.
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In economics, oligopoly refers to a market condition in which sellers are
so few that action of each seller has a measurable impact on the price and
other market factors [1]. If the number of firms competing on a commodity in
the market is just two, the oligopoly is termed as duopoly. The competitive
behavior of firms in oligopoly makes it suitable to be analyzed by using the
techniques of game theory. Cournot and Bertrand models are the two oldest and
famous oligopoly models [2, 3]. In Cournot model of oligopoly firms put certain
amount of homogeneous product simultaneously in the market and each firm
tries to maximize its payoff by assuming that the opponent firms will keep their
outputs constant. Later on Stackelberg introduced a modified form of Cournot
oligopoly in which the oligopolistic firms supply their products in the market
one after the other instead of their simultaneous moves. In Stackelberg duopoly
the firm that moves first is called leader and the other firm is the follower [4].
In Bertrand model the oligopolistic firms compete on price of the commodity,
that is, each firm tries to maximize its payoff by assuming that the opponent
firms will not change the prices of their products. The output and price are
related by the demand curve so the firms choose one of them to compete on
leaving the other free. For a homogeneous product, if firms choose to compete
on price rather than output, the firms reach a state of Nash equilibrium at
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which they charge a price equal to marginal cost. This result is usually termed
as Bertrand paradox, because practically it takes many firms to ensure prices
equal to marginal cost. One way to avoid this situation is to allow the firms to
sell differentiated products [1].
For the last one decade quantum game theorists are attempting to study
classical games in the domain of quantum mechanics [5-14]. Various quantum
protocols have been introduced in this regard and interesting results have been
obtained [15-25]. The first quantization scheme was presented by Meyer [15] in
which he quantized a simple penny flip game and showed that a quantum player
can always win against a classical player by utilizing quantum superposition.
In this letter, we extend the classical Bertrand duopoly with differentiated
products to quantum domain by using the quantization scheme proposed by
Marinatto and Weber [17]. Our results show that the classical game becomes
a subgame of the quantum version. We found that entanglement in the initial
state of the game makes the players better off. Before presenting the calculation
of quantization scheme, we first review the classical model of the game.
Consider two firms A and B producing their products at a constant marginal
cost c such that c < a, where a is a constant. Let p1 and p2 be the prices chosen
by each firm for their products, respectively. The quantities qA and qB that
each firm sells is given by the following key assumption of the classical Bertrand
duopoly model
qA = a− p1 + bp2
qB = a− p2 + bp1 (1)
where the parameter 0 < b < 1 shows the amount of one firm’s product sub-
stituted for the other firm’s product. It can be seen from Eq. (1) that more
quantity of the product is sold by the firm which has low price compare to the
price chosen by his opponent. The profit function of the two firms are given by
uA (p1, p2, b) = qA (p1 − c) = (a− p1 + bp2) (p1 − c)
uB (p1, p2, b) = qB (p2 − c) = (a− p2 + bp1) (p2 − c) (2)
In Bertrand duopoly the firms are allowed to change the quantity of their prod-
uct to be put in the market and compete only in price. A firm changes the price
of its product by assuming that the opponent will keep its price constant. Sup-
pose that firm B has chosen p2 as the price of his product, the optimal response
of firm A to p2 is obtained by maximizing its profit function with respect to its
own product’s price, that is, ∂uA/∂p1 = 0, this leads to
p1 =
1
2
(bp2 + a+ c) (3)
Firm B response to a fixed price p1 of firm A is obtained in a similar way and
is given by
p2 =
1
2
(bp1 + a+ c) (4)
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Solution of Eqs.(3 and 4) lead to the following optimal price level that defines
the Nash equilibrium of the game
p∗1 = p
∗
2 =
a+ c
2− b (5)
The profit functions of the firms at the Nash equilibrium become
u∗A = u
∗
B =
[
a+ c
2− b − c
]2
(6)
From Eq. (6), we see that both firms can be made better off if they choose
higher prices, that is, the Nash equilibrium is Pareto inefficient.
To quantize the game, we consider that the game space of each firm is a two
dimensional Hilbert space of basis vector |0〉 and |1〉, that is, the game consists
of two qubits, one for each firm. The composite Hilbert space H of the game is
a four dimensional space which is formed as a tensor product of the individual
Hilbert spaces of the firms, that is, H = HA⊗HB, where HA and HB are the
Hilbert spaces of firms A and B, respectively. To manipulate their respective
qubits each firm can have only two strategies I and C. Where I is the identity
operator and and C is the inversion operator also called Pauli spin flip operator.
If x and 1 − x stand for the probabilities of I and C that firm A applies and
y, 1− y, are the probabilities that firm B applies, then the final state ρf of the
game is given by [17]
ρf = xyIA ⊗ IB ρi I†A ⊗ I†B + x (1− y) IA ⊗ CB ρi I†A ⊗ C†B
+y (1− x)CA ⊗ IB ρi C†A ⊗ I†B
+(1− x) (1− y)CA ⊗ CB ρi C†A ⊗ C†B (7)
In Eq. (7) ρi = |ψi〉〈ψi| is the initial density matrix with initial state |Ψi〉,
which is given by
|ψi〉 = cos γ|00〉+ sin γ|11〉 (8)
where γ ∈ [0, pi] and represents the degree of entanglement of the initial state. In
Eq. (8) the first qubit corresponds to firm A and the second qubit corresponds
to firm B. The moves (prices) of the firms and the probabilities x, y of using
the operators can be related as follows,
x =
1
1 + p1
, y =
1
1 + p2
(9)
where the prices p1 and p2 ∈ [0,∞) and the probabilities x, y ∈ [0, 1]. By using
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Eqs. (7 - 9), the nonzero elements of the final density matrix are obtained as
ρ11 =
(cos2 γ + p1p2 sin
2 γ)
(1 + p1) (1 + p2)
ρ14 = ρ41 =
(1 + p1p2) cos γ sin γ
(1 + p1) (1 + p2)
ρ22 =
p2 cos
2 γ + p1 sin
2 γ
(1 + p1) (1 + p2)
ρ23 = ρ32 =
(p1 + p2) cos γ sin γ
(1 + p1) (1 + p2)
ρ33 =
p1 cos
2 γ + p2 sin
2 γ
(1 + p1) (1 + p2)
ρ44 =
p1p2 cos
2 γ + sin2 γ
(1 + p1) (1 + p2)
(10)
The payoffs of the firms can be found by the following trace operations
uA (p1, p2, b) = Trace
(
UoperA ρf
)
uB (p1, p2, b) = Trace
(
UoperB ρf
)
(11)
where UoperA and U
oper
B are payoffs operators of the firms, which we define these
as
UoperA =
qA
p12
(kBρ11 − ρ22 + ρ33)
UoperB =
qA
p12
(kAρ11 + ρ22 − ρ33) (12)
where kA = p1 − c, kB = p2 − c and p12 = 1(1+p1)(1+p2) . By using Eqs. (10 -
12), the payoffs of the firms are obtained as
uA (p1, p2, b) = (a− p1 + bp2)[kA cos2 γ + {p2 + p1(−1− cp2 + p22)} sin2 γ]
uB (p1, p2, b) = (a− p2 + bp1)[kB cos2 γ + {p1 − p2(1 + cp1 − p21)} sin2 γ]
(13)
One can easily see from Eq. (13) that the classical payoffs can be reproduced
by setting γ = 0 in Eq. (13).
We proceed similar to the classical Bertrand duopoly to find the response of
each firm to the price chosen by the opponent firm. For firm B’s price p2, the
optimal response of firm A is obtained by maximizing its own payoff (Eq. (13))
with respect to p1. Similarly, the reaction function of firm B to a known p1 is
obtained. These reaction functions can be written as
p1 =
kB [−1 + p2(a+ bp2)] + [c+ p2 + 2bp2 − bp22kB + a{2− p2kB}] cos 2γ
(2− p2kB) cos 2γ − 2p2kB
p2 =
kA[−1 + p1(a+ bp1)] + [c+ p1 + 2bp1 + bp21kA + a{2 + p1kA}] cos 2γ
(2− p1kA) cos 2γ + 2p1kA
(14)
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The results of Eq. (14) reduce to the classical results given in Eqs. (3 and 4)
for the initially unentangled state, that leads to the classical Nash equilibrium.
This shows that the classical game is a subgame of the quantum game.
Now, we discuss the behavior of entanglement in the initial state on the
game dynamics. It can be seen from Eq. (14) that the optimal responses of the
firms to a fixed price of the opponent firm, for a maximally entangled state, are
given by
p1 =
bp22 + ap2 − 1
2p2
p2 =
bp21 + ap1 − 1
2p1
(15)
Solving these equations, we can obtain the optimal price levels and the corre-
sponding payoffs of each firm. In this case the following four points are obtained
p∗1(1) = p
∗
2(1) =
a+
√
a2 + 4β
−2β
p∗1(2) = p
∗
2(2) =
2
a+
√
a2 + 4β
p∗1(3, 4) =
2b
a
√
2 + b
(√
2 + b± γ)
p∗2(3, 4) = −
1
2b
[
a± γ√
2 + b
]
(16)
where the numbers in the parentheses correspond to the respective points (the
symbols ± correspond to points 3 and 4 respectively). To verify which point
(points) defines the Nash equilibrium of the game, we use the second partial
derivative condition. That is, for Nash equilibrium, the strategy (point) must
be the global maximum of the payoff function, that is, ∂2uA(B)/∂p
2
1(2) < 0 and
the payoff function at the point must be higher than the payoff function at the
boundary points. It can easily be verified that this condition is satisfied only at
point 1. Hence point 1 defines the Nash equilibrium of the game. The payoffs
of the firms at the Nash equilibrium become
uA(1) = uB(1) =
1
4β4
[a4 + 2α2 + 2a2bβ + a3cβ − a{(β − 2)β − 3}cβ2
+
√
a2 + 4β(a3 + 2aα+ cα2 + a2cβ)] (17)
The new parameters introduced in Eqs. (16 and 17) are defined as β = b − 2,
α = 2 − 3b+ b2. The payoffs of the firms at the Nash equilibrium must be real
and positive for the entire range of substitution parameter b. This condition for
marginal cost c < 1.4 is satisfied when a ≥ 3.5. The firms’ payoffs at the other
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three points become
uA(2) = uB(2) = − 4
(a+
√
a2 + 4β)4
[a5c+ a(−1 + b){(−9 + 5b)c− 2
√
a2 + 4β}
−a3{(8− 5b)c+
√
a2 + 4β}+ (−1 + b)2(−2 + c
√
a2 + 4β)
+a4(−1 + c
√
a2 + 4β) + a2{6− 4c
√
a2 + 4β + b(−4 + 3c
√
a2 + 4β)}]
uA(3, 4) =
(1 + b)2(a2(2 + b)3/2 + a(2 + b)(b
√
2 + bc± Γ) + b(2b√2 + b± cΓ (2 + b)))
(2 + b)3/2(a(2 + b)±√2 + bΓ)2
uB(3, 4) = −
(1 + b)2
√
2 + b
[
2ac+ abc− 2b±√2 + bΓc]
4b(2 + b)5/2
(18)
where Γ =
√
4b2 + a2(2 + b).
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Figure 1: The payoffs of the firms at the classical and quantum Nash equilibria
against the substitution parameter b. The values of the parameter a and the
marginal cost c are chosen as 3.5 and 0.1, respectively. The superscripts C and
Q of u represent the classical and quantum cases, respectively. The subscripts
A stands for firm A.
We present a quantization scheme for the Bertrand duopoly with differen-
tiated products. To analyze the effect of quantum entanglement on the game
dynamics, we plot the payoffs of the firms at the classical and quantum Nash
equilibria against the substitution parameter b in figure (1). The values of pa-
rameters a and c are chosen to be 3.5 and 0.1, respectively. The solid line
(uQA(1)) represents quantum mechanical payoffs and the dotted line (u
C
A) repre-
sents the classical payoffs of the firms. It is clear from the figure that quantum
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payoffs of the firms are higher than the classical payoffs for the entire range of
substitution parameter b. The maximum entanglement in the initial state of the
game makes the firms better off. In figure (2), we plot the payoffs of the firms
(Eq. 18) against the substitution parameter b at the other three points which
are not the Nash equilibria.
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Figure 2: The payoffs of the firms at the second and third points as a func-
tion of the substitution parameter b. The values of the parameter a and the
marginal cost c are chosen as 3.5 and 0.1, respectively. The superscript Q of u
represent the classical and quantum cases, respectively. The subscripts A and
B correspond to firms A and B respectively. The numbers in the parentheses
represent the corresponding Nash equilibrium points.
In conclusion, we have used the Marinatto and Weber quantization scheme
to find the quantum version of Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products.
We have studied the entanglement behavior on the payoffs of the firms for a
maximally entangled initial state. We found that for large values of substitution
parameter b, both firms can achieve significantly higher payoffs as compared to
the classical payoffs. Furthermore, for maximally entangled state the quantum
payoffs are higher than the classical payoffs for the entire range of substitution
parameter and is the best situation for both firms. Thus, the dilemma-like
situation in the classical Bertrand duopoly game is resolved.
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